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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE S'TATE OF UTAH 
STANFORD ll. PETERSEN and 
CAROL A. PETERSEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
INTERMOlJNTAIN CAPITAL 
CORPORATION, Case No. 
D-efendant-Respondent. 12984 
D. SPENCER NILSON, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANFORD B. PETERSEN, et. al., 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE1\1ENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, Petersens sued Defendant, Intermoun-
tain Capital Corporation, for damages by reason of an 
alleged breach of contract. Involved in the transactions 
between the parties was a Promissory Note and l\'lort-
1 
gage, executed by Plaintiffs in favor of Defendant. The 
foreclosure of the Note and Mortgage was later brought 
in a separate case and the lower court consolidated the 
two cases, treating the second case as a counterclaim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\i\TER COURT 
Judgment was granted by the trial court inf avor of 
Defendant on the counterclaim for the amount of the 
Note, interest and attorney's fees and a foreclosure of 
the Mortgage. The Plaintiffs' Complaint was dismissed 
upon its merits and with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As in Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, Plaintiffs shall 
be referred to as Petersen and Defendant, Intermoun· 
tain Capital Corporation, shall be referred to as ICC. 
Appellants' Statement of Facts is incomplete and 
must be enlarged. 
In the exchange of properties between Petersens 
and ICC, as shown in the January 22, 1966 agreement 
( Exh. 8-P) , there was a provision (Paragraph 5) con· 
templating a future loan of $20,000.00 within one year, 
and with I CC solely to determine the time, and provid· 
ing for a Promissory Note at 9 per cent per annum to be 
paid in three equal annual installments with a Firs'I 
Mortgage on the Wyoming Properties as the security. 
The Wyoming Properties were involved in the exchange 
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le agreement, known by ICC and valued at least in the 
it sum of $u7 ,200.00 ( Exh. 4-D). 
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Money was very tight, in fact the tightest money 
market in the history of the country, and not available to 
loan by ICC to Petersen during 1966 and early 1967 (R. 
46, 47, 48, 59, 61, 70) although attempts were made by 
ICC to help and to offer some of their receivables, or 
their other property, to Petersen to try and generate the 
funds, but each time Petersen indicated that he could 
wait. These conversations also extended beyond the years 
time of January 22, 1967 (R. 70). 
On April 5, 1967, a demand was made by letter to 
ICC to loan within seven days the $20,000.00 to Peter-
sen or Petersen would either declare a forefeiture of the 
January 22, 1966 Agreement or institute a legal action 
for specific performance or damages (Exh. 9-P). With-
in a day or two after receiving the demand letter, Mr. 
Whiteley of ICC went to the home of Petersen and 
asked what the least he could get by with until they 
could do something better, and Petersen responded that 
he really needed $5,000.00. Mr. 'Vhiteley then promised 
to come up with at least $5,000.00, which was arranged 
for and consummated on May 12, 1967 (R. 71, 72). That 
$5,000.00 Note was secured by a Mortgage on a Salt 
Lake City property rather than the 'Vyoming Property 
to accommodate Petersen. Mr. 'Vhiteley had requested 
the Wyoming Property be used as security but Petersen 
indicated there was not time to get a title report ( R. 7 4, 
75). 
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Over two years later, on July 7, 1969, Petersen filed 
their law suit for damages against ICC, after ICC's 
auditor ha<l requested confirmation of the $5,000.00 
Note from Petersen, which had not been paid (R. 73). 
No effort was made to bring that case to trail until suit 
was brought on the $5,00.00 Note in December 1971 
I 
after which time the two cases were consolidated. 
On October 1, 1966, almost four months before ex-
piration of the year provided for in the January 22, 1966 
Agreement, Petersen sold the W yarning Properties Ull· 
der a Uniform Real Estate Contract to James S .. Mill· 
iron, with a $17,000.00 credit or down payment and 
$50,2000.00 to be paid over a period of years at $3,600.00 
per year with interest at 6 per cent per annum. Para· 
graph 6 of said contract also showed the existence of an 
encumbrance and obligation against the properties in 
favor of the Bank of Salt Lake in the sum of $12,000.00 
(Exh. 4-D). 
Furthermore, in January 1967 Petersen had talked 
with Milliron about discounting the contract for cash 
(R. 49, 50). On lVIay 5, 1967, seven days before the 
$5,000.00 loan was made to Petersen by ICC, Petersen 
in fact discounted the contract to Milliron for cash and 
had no further interest or security in the 'Vyoming 
Properties to pledge to ICC (Exh. 16-P, R. 50). 
None of these facts concerning l\filliron was made 
known to ICC by Petersen, and ICC was not otherwise 
aware of these facts until long after May 12, 1967 (R. 
63, 73). 
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In a<lditioll, it was for the first time learned at the 
trial of these cases Ly ICC and their counsel that at the 
time of the $5,000.00 loan on l\Iay 12, 1967 by ICC, 
Petersen simply never intended to pay back that 
$5,000.00 loan ( R. 66, 67). Further, ICC would not 
have made the loan of $5,000.00 to Petersen had Peter-
sen disclosed these facts ( R. 73, 7 4) . 
ARGUlVIENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FINDING THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE 
PARTIES VVAIVED AND/OR EXTENDED 
SPECIFIC PER.FORlVIANCE OF THE JANU-
ARY 2i, 1966 AGREEMENT, AND THAT THE 
PROl\lISSORY NOTE AND l\IORTGAGE EXE-
CUTED IN EXCHANGE FOR $5,000.00 CON-
STITUTED AN ACCORD AND SATISFAC-
TION. 
Appellants Points I and II of their argument shall 
be treated and answered together in respondent's Point 
I. However, it should be particularly noted that if the 
lower court correctly found on any one of the points that 
appellants assign as error, to-wit; ( 1) That the conduct 
of Petersen created an impossible situation, which would 
and did prevent ICC from performing the January 22, 
19f)6 agreement as to the $20,000.00 loan ,or ( 2) that 
the $5,000.00 note and mortgage dated l\Iay 12, 1967 
5 
constituted an accord and satisfaction, or ( 3) that spe. 
cific performance by ICC of the January 22, 1966 agree. 
ment was waived and/ or extended by the actions of the 
parties, then the trial court's decision of dismissing 
Petersens case for damages for breach of contract and 
awarding judgment in favor of ICC on their note and 
mortgage must be upheld by this court. 
The trial court simply found no basis for breach of 
the January 22, 1966 agreement, as far as ICC was con. 
cerned. In that agreement (Exh. 8-P) paragraph 5 it 
states as fallows: 
"Intermountain also agrees to loan Petersen 
$20,000.00 within one year from the date of the 
execution of their agreement. The time that said 
loan is to be made within said one year period 
shall be determined solely by Intermountain. 
Said indebtedness shall be evidenced by a promis-
sory note providing for the payment of the prin-
cipal amount of $20,000.00 plus interest at the 
rate of 93 per annum on the unpaid balance in 
three ( 3) equal annual installments. Payment of 
said indebtedness shall be secured by a first mort· 
gage on the Wyoming properties." 
This paragraph 5 is the only portion of the entire 
agreement that is in controversy. It was a promise by 
ICC to loan money in exchange for a return promise by 
Petersen to give a first mortgage on the Wyoming prop· 
erties as security and to be paid back in 3 annual pay· 
ments at 93 interest. 
It is apparent from the facts in the case that the 
parties by mutual consent, or by their actions intended 
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aud actually did exteud the time of performance of these 
promises beyond the years time of January 22, 1967, 
me11tioned in said paragraph 5 ( R. 46, 47, 59, 61, 62, 70). 
Counsel for appellants seems to admit this fact also as 
stated in his Brief at pages 7 to 9 wherein the conversa-
tions between the parties were noted. Then, in the last 
paragraph on page 9 counsel states: 
"The conversations between Petersen and \Vhite-
ley show that both of them recognized that the 
original agreement was still to be performed." 
Also in the record at page 70, lines 18 to 26, ~Ir. 
Whiteley testified as follows: 
"So we were in bad circumstances for working 
capital, and we explained this to Mr. Petersen, 
and I know there were several meetings after the 
years time when he indicated that he needed the 
money and he needed it badly, and at each time 
we told him we were doing all we could and we 
were expecting to have some money in and we 
hoped that we would be able to handle it but 
could he please wait a little longer. And on each 
occasion he said, 'alright, let me know when you 
can do something. I will wait.' " 
It is also obvious that Petersen had waived and/ or 
extended specific performance of the $20,000.00 loan 
promise beyond January 22, 1967, by his letter, through 
his attorney, to ICC of April 5, 1967 (Exh. 9-P). The 
letter states as follows: 
"Demand is hereby made upon you to advance 
$20,000.00 to the Petersens according to the 
terms of the agreement within seven days from 
7 
the date of this letter. In the event you fail to do 
so, Petersens will either declare a forfeiture of 
the agreement and proceed to regain their inter· 
est in the Travelodge lHotel, or institute legal ac· 
tion for specific performance or damages." 
In other words ICC was given 7 days from April 5, 
1967 to comply with the demand and to make arrange· 
ments with Petersen. ICC through lVhiteley, thereupon 
made arrangements, within a matter of 2 days, to satisfy 
Petersen with a promise to come up with $5,000.00 as a 
loan. This was then consummated by lVIay l~, 1967. 
Consequently, there was no breach by ICC of the 
January 22, 1966 agreement, for the parties had acqui· 
esced in or consented to an extension of and/ or a waiv-
ing of the time of performance, at least to lVIay 12, 1967, 
when the $5,000.00 was loaned. It is also obvious that 
after May 12, 1967, there was no way that ICC could 
have breached paragraph 5 of the agreement mentioned, 
for Petersen had in fact repudiated said paragraph 5 in 
doing away completely with the 'Vyoming properties, 
the security upon which the $20,000.00 loan was to be 
based, as of May 5, 1967 (Exh. 16-P, R. 50). There is 
therefore ample evidence from the facts and testimony 
in this case to support the trial courts findings and con· 
clusion on this point. 
It is also well settled in the law that there may be a 
waiver by approval or acceptance of performance differ· 
ent from the agreement made. In 17 Am. J ur. 2nd page 
838, section 393, it states: 
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''As a general principle, the performance of con-
ditions or of promises is dispensed with when it is 
waived by acceptance of performance differing 
from the performance required by the contract. 
Such acceptance may be express or it may be im-
plied from conduct." 
In 17 Am. J ur. 2nd, page 835, section 390, we read: 
"Strict and full performance of a contract by one 
party may be waived by the other party, irt which 
case there is, to the extent of the waiver, no right 
to damages for the failure to perform strictly or 
fully." 
Then again in the same section 390 at page 836 and 
837, we quote: 
"An unexplained delay in enforcing a contract 
may constitute evidence of waiver and acqui-
escence in nonperformance." 
Our case comes within these general principles, in 
light of Petersen's acquiescing in the delay for the loan 
beyond January 22, 1967 and in light of his demand 
letter of April 5, 1967, his acceptance of the $5,000.00 
loan on lVIay 12, 1967, and finally his unexplained delay 
in trying to enforce the alleged contract provisions over 
two years later. 
Furthermore, on May 12, 1967, when ICC loaned 
~5,000.00 to Petersen and was induced to take different 
security than was called for in paragraph 5 of the agree-
ment, it simply had to be in lieu of and in satisfaction of 
the obligations and promises stated in said paragraph 5 
and thus constituted :in accord and satisfaction of any 
9 
claim Petersen may have had. It was either an accord 
and satisfaction, or it was a fraud upon ICC, or perhaps 
both, for on .lVIay 12, 1967 when Petersen accepted the 
$5,000.00 loan he knew he could in no way provide the 
Wyoming properties as security for a $20,000.00 loan, 
for he had completely disposed of it on May 5, 1967. 
It is clear from the evidence that Petersen consid· 
ered that $5,000.00 to be the only loan he was going to 
get from ICC. Counsel for appeIIants quoted from the 
record at page 63 part of the testimony of Petersen on 
cross-examination where Petersen admitted that on May 
12, 1967, he asked for $20,000.00 from ICC and was told 
they could not loan that sum, but did come up with 
$5,000.00. However, counsel failed to quote the next two 
questions and answers which are pertinent. They are as 
follows: 
Q. "Now, why-now, let me ask you this. Did 
you ever disclose to him that you had sold the 
property in Wyoming? 
A.No. 
Q. Then why were you insisting on $20,000.00 
even after May 5th when you disposed of all of 
that property, knowing that you could not have 
given security for the $20,000.00? 
A. The reason I asked him was I was just won· 
dering if he would have ever paid me the 
$20,000.00, and, second, knowing that I had dis· 
counted the contract $20,000.00 I felt he owed 
that $20,000.00 in damages." 
It is apparent, then, that even though ICC did not 
fully realize (because of the non disclosure) on May 12, 
10 
Hlu7, the complete satisfaction of the January 22, 1966 
agreement by the $5,000.00 loan, Petersen knew it, real-
ized it and accepted it in that light, and cannot now deny 
it or take advantage of the situation, for ICC accepted 
the fact 011ce they had knowledge of the true circum-
stances. vV e believe that this situation comes within the 
definition of accord and satisfaction as set out by this 
court in Brou.111ing v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of 
the U.S., 94 Utah .532, 72 P 2nd 1060 ( 1937) Reh. den. 
94 Utah 570, 80 P 2nd 348 ( 1939) : 
"An accord is an agreement between parties, one 
to give or perform, the other to receive or accept, 
such agreed payment or performance in satisfac-
tion of a claim. The 'satisfaction' is the consuma-
tion of such agreement." 
In our case a $5,000.00 loan was given or performed 
by ICC in place of a $20,000.00 loan and the recipient 
accepting the same was Petersen. The consideration was 
an acceptance by ICC of security less than and different 
from the Wyoming properties previously agreed upon. 
The trial court therefore, properly ruled that the 
actions of the parties waived and/ or extended specific 
performance of the January 22, 1966 agreement, and 
thus there was no breach by ICC, and further the loan 
of $5,000.00, on May 12, 1967 constituted an accord and 
satisfaction. 
POINT II 
TlIE CONDUCT AND ACTIONS OF 
PETERSEN CREATED AN IMPOSSIBLE 
11 
SITUATION, 'VI-IICH DID PREVENT OR 
EXCUSE ICC FRO~I PER.FOR~IING THE 
AGREElHENT AS TO THE $20,000.00 LOAN 
REFERRED TO IN THE JANUARY 22, 196u 
AGREEMENT. 
Since the money market was so tight during Hl6u 
and 1967, the only way ICC would loan $20,000.00 to 
Petersen was on the condition and promise of repayment 
in three equal annual installments, at 9 % interest ana 
secured by a First Mortgage on the 'Vyoming Proper-
ties, of substantial value, being in excess of $67 ,000.00. 
On October l, 1966, almost four months before the 
year was up, which was provided for in the January 22, 
1966 agreement for making the loan, at ICC's option, 
Petersen sold the Wyoming Properties on contract to 
James Milliron and this was not disclosed to I CC ( Exh. 
4-d; R. 63, 73) . 
Counsel for appellants would have us believe that 
this action of Petersen made no difference, that he was 
still entitled to a $20,000.00 loan regardless of his en· 
cumbering the security. However, Paragraph 5 of the 
agreement created dependent promises. Petersen had no 
right to rely on ICC's promise to loan $20,000.00 if ICC 
could not rely on Petersen's promise to pay it back in 
three annual payments, meaning over $6,600.00 per year 
plus 9 % interest, with the Wyoming Properties as se· 
curity (First Mortgage). Petersen could not force or 
require ICC to take substitute security, even if it had 
been available, any more than ICC could have forced a 
12 
suLstitutc loan upon Petersen without changing the 
agreement or hy mutual consent of the parties. Ther..: 
~was also no evidence in the record that Petersen ha<l 
other security of the value of the W yenning Properties. 
When Petersen sold the properties to Milliron he 
changed the security in such a way that he made it im-
possible for him to perform his part of the agreement. 
The contract with Milliron provided for $3,600.00 an-
nual payments and 6 % interest. The security Yalue was 
reduced $17,000.00 and in addition another $12,000.00, 
encumbrance was shown with the Bank of Salt Lake. 
Paragraph 8 of said contract also states: 
"The Seller is given the option to secure, execute 
and maintain loans secured by said property of 
not to exceed the then unpaid contract balance 
hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to 
exceed six per cent per annum and payable in 
regular installments; provided that the aggregate 
monthly installment payments required to be 
made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater 
than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract." 
Petersen had therefore obligated himself, under 
that contract, in October 1966, not to make loans on that 
property that would exceed 6% interest per annum and 
where the annual payments would not exceed $3,600.00. 
It was, therefore, not possible under that contract for 
Petersen to use the Wyoming Properties as security 
with ICC, where 9% interest was to be charged and over 
$6,600.00 was to paid annually. 
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Counsel for Appellants argues, however, that Mill. 
iron would have agreed to change the contract to ac. 
commodate Petersen, but their statement is only hearsa) 
and self serving and does not change the contractual 
facts, and is of little value in light of the further faci 
that Petersen did not reveal to ICC this sale until lo11g 
after he had obtained some money from them. 
Now where the promises of the parties are depend. 
ent, 01· amount to a counter promise, or a co11dition pre. 
cedent, as in our case, Petersen simply has no standing i11 
Court and cannot recover on his alleged claim for Bread 
of Contract for failure of ICC to loan $20,000.00, unles1 
Petersen was able to perform his part of the promise or 
condition for the loan and provide the security as agreed. 
In 17 Am. J ur. 2nd, Section 362, at Page 805, it 
states this general rule: 
"Generally, therefore, the performance of a de· 
pendent promise or covenant is a condition to re· 
covery on the counterpromise or countercore· 
nant .... The rule is that it is a good defense to an 
action on a contract that the obligation to per· 
form the act required was dependent upon some 
other thing which the other party was to do and 
has failed to do." 
Also in 17 Am. J ur. 2nd, 898 Section 441, it states: 
"It is held that a party who seeks to recover dam· 
ages from the other party to a contract for a 
breach must show that he himself is free from 
fault in respect to performance of a dependent 
promise, or counterpromise, or a condition prece· 
dent." 
14 
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Furthermore, in Secti011 355 of 17 Am. J ur. 2nd at 
Pages 792-793, we read: 
"In the case of concurrent obligations the party 
seeking the legal enforcement of the stipulation 
of the other must first show a compliance with 
his own. On principles of general justice, if the 
acts are to be done at the same time, neither party 
to such a contract can claim a fulfillment thereof, 
unless he has first performed or is ready to per-
form all acts required on his own part." 
Again this subject is treated in 17 Am. J ur. 2nd, 
880, Section 425 as follows: 
"If the impossibility of performance arises di-
rectly or even indirectly from the acts of the 
promisee, it is sufficient excuse for nouperf orm-
ance. This is upon the principle that he who pre-
vents a thing may not avail himself of the non-
performance which he has occasioned." 
"It is also the rule that a party may not insist 
upon the performance of a contract or a provision 
thereof where he himself is guilty of a material or 
substantial breach of that contract or provision. 
The party first committing a substantial breach 
of a contract cannot maintain an action against 
the other contracting party for a subsequent fail-
ure to perform a promise, if the promises are de-
pendent. A failure to perform a promise, the per-
formance of which is a condition precedent, is an 
excuse for nonperformance of the promise or 
promises made by the other Party." 
The annotation in 84 A.L.R. 2nd, Section 12 (b) at 
Page 6.5 under the heading "Impossibility caused or pre-
ventable or remediable by promisee," further empha-
sizes: 
15 
"A standard treatise states that if the impossibil. 
ity of performance arises directly or indirecth 
from the acts of the promisee, it is a sufficient ex. 
cuse for nonperformance by the promisor. This i~ 
upon the principle that he who prevents a thin~ 
may not avail himself of the nonperformanct 
which he has occasioned. Nonperformance of a 
contract in accordance with its terms is excuseo 
if performance is prevented by the conduct of tht 
adverse party." 
On January 22, 1967, Petersen was not able to corn· 
ply with his part of the agreement even if he had made a 
proper demand. \Vhen Petersen finally did make a de-
mand for performance by ICC on April 5, 1967 ano 
ICC managed to come up with $5,000.00 in response to 
that demand, Petersen induced ICC to take other seem· 
ity than the \Vyoming Properties, knowing that he coulo 
not comply with his part of the agreement. This wa1 
tantamount to nullifying the agreement. In 84< A.L.R. 
2nd at Page 32, wherein the question of impossibility of 
performance is annotated, it states: 
"Williston comments that existing impossibility 
known to one party and not to the other would 
probably render the transaction voidable for 
fraud." 
Also it states at 17 Am. J ur. 2nd, Section 403, 
Pages 850 and 851 as follows: 
"Ignorance of facts warranting or excusing non· 
performance or repudiation of the contract doe1 
not affect the right to assert such facts, after the~ 
are discovered as such justification or excuse. 
A party sued for breach of contract may ordi-
16 
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at the time a legal excuse for nonperformance 
or repudiatiou, although he was then ignorant 
of that fact." 
If there was any question about the repudiation of 
Paragraph 5 of the January 22, 1966 agreemeut by 
Petersen in October 1966, there should be no question 
about it by ~lay .5, 1967 when Petersen disposed of all 
the "T yoming Properties and still kept I CC dangling 
and in the dark on his true intentions. \Ve, thereLre, 
submit that the trial court had ample evidence aud law 
to sustain its conclusion that Petersen's conduct and ac-
tions did create an impossible situation and did prevent 
or excuse ICC from performing as to the $20,000.00 
loan. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NO'l' ERR IN 
DIS1\1ISSING PETERSEN'S C0.1\IPLAINT UP-
ON ITS ~IERITS AND 'VITH PREJUDICE. 
There is sufficient evidence and law to support the 
lower courts findings and conclusions on all of the points 
discussed in this Brief, in dismissing Petersen's Com-
plaint for damages, but we reiterate that the court would 
be justified in its ruling on any one of said issues. 
Contrary to counsel for appellants' statement, 
ICC's answer does not admit to any breach of contract. 
It denies a refusal to loan $20,000.00 to Petersen and 
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then sets out several affirmative def ens es. There wa 
also no evidence of breach. 
Furthermore, the action of Petersen in selling th1 
\Vyoming Properties in October of 1966, before the tilllt 
had expired for performance by ICC, and obtai11i111 
$17,000.00 in cash or property as a down payment thert 
fore negates any argument of counsel for Petersen tha: 
he suffered any damages that could be attributed !1 
I CC on the loan. It was not as though I CC owe1J 
$20,000.00 to Petersen. If the loan had been made 01 
$20,000.00, it would have to be paid back and securn 
by the '¥ yoming Properties, but Petersen had alread) 
obtained $17,000.00 on those Properties and so he can; 
"have his cake and eat it too," as he was apparent!) 
trying to do, and then hold ICC for damages. 
The lower court was, therefore, justified in dismiss· 
ing Petersen's Complaint under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
In the trial of this case, many of the facts were stip· 
plated to and there was no real controversy or absenc: 
of supporting proof on the issues. Thus, the Supremt 
Court must follow the findings and judE,rrnent of tht 
lower court. (See Whittaker vs. Ferguson, 16 U. 24~. 
51 P. 980). 
It is quite obvious that by October 1966, Peterseu 
could see that money was tight and difficult to obtaiu 
and so he sold the Wyoming Properties, and although hi 
18 
liad repudiated his part of the agreement of January 2~, 
H.166, Petersen continued to press for the loan of money 
from ICC. Had ICC known of the sale to Milliron, that 
would have ended the problem because ICC would have 
made no further attempts to obtain money to try and 
satisfy, what they thought was their continuing obliga-
tion. Then when the demand letter of April 5, 1967 
came, I CC did manage to come up with $5,000.00 to 
satisfy that demand. Therefore, on May 12, 1067 when 
the $5,000.00 loan was consummated, and in view of the 
fact that on May 5, 1967, Petersen had completely done 
away with the Wyoming Properties, had failed to dis-
dose this to ICC, and had no intention to pay the money 
back, the obligation (if any) on the part of ICC had 
been completely satisfied as to the January 22, 1966 
agreement. 
Consequently, the lower court's decision in dismiss-
ing Petersen's Complaint and rendering judgment in 
favor of ICC on the $5,000.00 note and mortgage, to-
gether with interest and attorneys fees should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GAYLEN S. YOUNG, JR., for 
SPAFFORD & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
2188 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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